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Abstract: To date the concept of the bioeconomy—an economy based primarily on biogenic instead
of fossil resources—has largely been associated with visions of “green growth” and the advancement
of biotechnology and has been framed from within an industrial perspective. However, there is
no consensus as to what a bioeconomy should effectively look like, and what type of society it
would sustain. In this paper, we identify different types of narratives constructed around this
concept and carve out the techno-political implications they convey. We map these narratives
on a two-dimensional option space, which allows for a rough classification of narratives and
their related imaginaries into four paradigmatic quadrants. We draw the narratives from three
different sources: (i) policy documents of national and supra-national authorities; (ii) stakeholder
interviews; and (iii) scenarios built in a biophysical modelling exercise. Our analysis shows that there
is a considerable gap between official policy papers and visions supported by stakeholders. At least
in the case of Austria there is also a gap between the official strategies and the option space identified
through biophysical modelling. These gaps testify to the highly political nature of the concept of the
bioeconomy and the diverging visions of society arising from it.
Keywords: bioeconomy; transition; biotechnology; bio-resources; technopolitics; agro-ecology;
sufficiency; capitalism
1. Introduction
With the climate challenge looming large and the depletion of fossil energy resources at the
horizon; the vision of a bioeconomy—an economy based primarily on biogenic instead of fossil
resources—has risen to political prominence in recent years. The European Union has become one
of the most fervent proponents of the concept and with its “Low Carbon Roadmap” [1] and the
“Bioeconomy Strategy” [2] has committed itself to establishing a bioeconomy until 2050.
To date the concept has largely been associated with visions of “green growth” and the
advancement of agricultural and industrial biotechnologies and has been framed from within
an industrial perspective. However, there is no consensus as to what a bioeconomy could or
should effectively look like and what type of society it would sustain. While there are some
emergent alternative visions, which focus on small-scale and organic agriculture and include a
sufficiency perspective that requires absolute reductions of consumption levels [3,4], they are politically
marginalised [5]. However, there may be many more options than a binary juxtaposition of these
two poles. This paper aims to explore the techno-political option space the concept of a bioeconomy
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offers and to identify clusters of narratives of the bioeconomy with their respective socio-economic,
biophysical and political implications. We start from the assumption that a transition to a bioeconomy
can take many forms and lead to many different types of societies. Consequently, the objective to
engage in a transition to a low-carbon bioeconomy is fraught with diverging techno-political choices
based on conflicting or even incompatible visions. Either these choices can remain invisible to the
wider public and marginalised by hegemonic discourses and interests, or they can become subject to
democratic deliberations, contestations and decision-making. In this paper, we take the normative
position that it is important to make the choices involved in the concept of a bioeconomy visible and
subject to open and democratic contestation.
Methodologically, we employ concepts from discourse analysis and science and technology
studies (STS) that have fruitfully been applied to the study of the bioeconomy in the past. In doing so,
we build on work by Levidow et al. [4] and Hecht [6]. We follow their approach in conceptualising
the techno-political choices as technosocial “narratives”, and the societal visions they convey as
“imaginaries”. Originally coined by François Lyotard, the term (master-)narrative in STS refers to “the
cultural vehicles through which ideas of progress are linked to S&T in particular ways. These are
not ‘merely’ stories or fictions. They are an important part of the cultural and institutional fabric,
of taken-for-granted aspects of social order” ([7], p. 12). Such narratives constitute frames through
which societal problems and their solutions are constructed in a mutually constitutive way, that is,
within a given narrative “the putative technoscientific solutions pre-define the problems to be solved”
([4], p. 42).
Narratives are “founded in collective imaginations and associated material objects and
institutional practices, together constituting what social scientists sometimes refer to as imaginaries”
([7], p. 73). Imaginaries, as defined in critical discourse analysis, “pre-figure a possible and intended
reality, which includes an objective and a strategy to achieve it” ([4], p. 42). They convey visions of
how things might or could or should be, and as such, according to Fairclough (2010), they “are an
integral part of strategies; and if strategies are successful and become implemented, then associated
imaginaries can become operationalized, transformed into practice, made real” ([8], cited in [4], p. 42).
According to Gabrielle Hecht, the term technopolitics “describes the strategic practice of designing
or using technology to constitute, embody, or enact political goals” ([6], p. 56). We loosely draw on
this definition in order to express our view that technological choices are always deeply embedded in
political visions of society and in pre-existing networks of institutions, actors, interests and ideologies,
which Hecht calls technopolitical regimes (ibid.). The diverging visions of the bioeconomy therefore
epitomise different technopolitical strategies to promote and ultimately realise potentially very different
types of society.
With this paper, we aim to add to a developing body of literature—prominently in this
journal—that is concerned with understanding the societal meaning and consequences of the concept of
the bioeconomy, e.g., [3,9–15]). We identify different types of narratives constructed around the concept
of the bioeconomy and carve out the specific visions of societal development they convey. We map
these narratives on a two-dimensional “techno-political option space”, which allows for a rough
classification of narratives into four quadrants representing societal master-narratives (Sustainable
Capital; Eco-Growth; Eco-Retreat; and Planned Transition). In doing so, we arrive at a typology
that is organised along broad techno-political visions rather than narrowly defined socio-technical
criteria [10,16]. We draw the narratives from three different sources: (i) policy documents from national
and supra-national authorities; (ii) stakeholder interviews; and (iii) scenarios built in a biophysical
modelling exercise. The aim is to compare and contrast “official” elite-driven narratives with those
of other stakeholders in academia, industry, agriculture and civil society and with narratives that are
scientifically constructed in complex system modelling based on biophysical data. The result is a map
that reveals clusters of imaginaries and the gaps between them and that may help opening up the
debate about the various techno-political choices involved in a transition to a bioeconomy.
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We then confront the techno-political narratives derived through the application of
discourse-analytical methods with biophysical scenarios derived from a complex system modelling
exercise. This combination of very different methods to conceptualize and assess narratives and
scenarios, respectively, helps us to ‘ground’ the techno-political narratives in biophysical reality.
Thus, we can start to assess and discuss to what extent the narratives and visions present in the
techno-political options-space of society are consistent with the biophysical option-space of society.
In conclusion, we discuss the resulting techno-political options and their implications for both politics
and future research.
2. Diverging Visions of the Bioeconomy
While conceptions of a bioeconomy can be traced back to the 1990s [17], the concept gained
political salience after the year 2000. On the most general level, a bioeconomy “can be understood
as an economy where the basic building blocks for materials, chemicals and energy are derived
from renewable biological resources, such as plant and animal sources” ([18], p. 2590). Within this
broad understanding, several diverging visions of the bioeconomy have emerged. In the academic
literature, some attempts have been made to identify different uses of the bioeconomy concept.
Staffas et al. [15], for example, distinguish between the ‘bioeconomy’ (BE) and the ‘bio-based economy’
(BBE). The term BE is being used predominantly by the OECD, who defined it as “transforming life
science knowledge into new, sustainable, eco-efficient and competitive products” ([19], p. 326, cited
in [15], p. 2755). Thus, “[t]he concept of the BE is focused on the methods of conversion of raw
material into value added products” ([15], p. 2755), and in particular on biotechnology as a conversion
technology. By contrast, the European Union (EU) uses the term BBE, which, according to the authors,
“focuses on the raw material rather than the conversion process” ([15], p. 2756). In a document from
2011, for example, the European Commission (EC) states that “a bio-based economy integrates the
full range of natural and renewable biological resources—land and sea resources, biodiversity and
biological materials (plant, animal and microbial), through to the processing and the consumption
of these bio-resources” ([20], p. 9). While the BE concept is thus technology-driven, the BBE-concept
is resource-driven in that it foregrounds the task of a transition from a fossil-based to a bio-based
economic system. Within the BBE concept, Levidow et al. [4,12] identified two contending visions—one
(again) biotechnology-oriented, the other agro-ecology oriented. The biotech-vision is influenced by
the OECD conception of the bioeconomy and is politically dominant, whereas the agro-ecological
vision is influenced by organic farming and alternative visions of the food and energy system and is,
unsurprisingly, politically marginalised.
We can thus distinguish—very much in line with recent findings by Bugge et al. [10]—three broad
types of narratives: a biotechnology-centred one; a bio-resource-centred one and an agro-ecological
one. The biotechnology-centred vision of the bioeconomy was the first to emerge and closely tied to
the agenda of the life sciences and biotech industry [12,18]. Only later were environmental objectives
included—in particular climate change mitigation and the transition to a sustainable post-fossil
society—and the focus of the narrative shifted somewhat toward an economy based on renewable
biomass and “green growth”.
In the EU, the search for a new economic paradigm after a phase of stagnation led to the call
for a knowledge-based economy (KBE) in the 2000 Lisbon Agenda [21], which was soon extended to
become the ‘knowledge-based bio-economy’ (KBBE) [22,23]. This extension testifies to the European
Commission (EC)’s belief that the life sciences and biotechnology are “probably the most promising
of the frontier technologies” to further the Lisbon Agenda’s objective of making Europe the leading
knowledge-based economy ([22], p. 8). This technology-driven perspective changed slightly into a
purpose-driven one when, in the first decade of the new millennium, the climate discourse gained
unprecedented urgency, as marked by the publication of the Stern Review in 2006 [24] and the 2007
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report [25]. The EU responded to the climate challenge in a number of
strategy documents, including the 20-20-20 climate goals established in 2008 [26], the EU 2020 strategy
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from 2010 [27] and the resource efficiency platform established in 2011 [28]. In 2012, the EC launched a
new bioeconomy strategy, which explicitly builds on these policy documents. This strategy document,
entitled “Innovating for Sustainable Growth: A Bioeconomy for Europe” [2], starts by proclaiming that:
“In order to cope with an increasing global population, rapid depletion of many resources,
increasing environmental pressures and climate change, Europe needs to radically change
its approach to production, consumption, processing, storage, recycling and disposal of
biological resources. [ . . . ] Establishing a bioeconomy in Europe holds a great potential:
it can maintain and create economic growth and jobs in rural, coastal and industrial areas,
reduce fossil fuel dependence and improve the economic and environmental sustainability
of primary production and processing industries” ([2], p. 2).
Within this strategy, the bioeconomy is defined to encompass “the production of renewable
biological resources and the conversion of these resources and waste streams into value added products,
such as food, feed, bio-based products and bioenergy”. This definition emphasises the strategy’s focus
on renewable resources, circular economic processes and bioenergy, while it leaves open the role of
biotechnology. In this respect, the EU narrative diverges considerably from that of the OECD, whose
strategy document “The Bioeconomy to 2030: Designing a Policy Agenda” from 2009 [19], is almost
entirely dedicated to the political advancement of biotechnology. It reveals this ambition when it
states that ‘[b]iotechnology offers technological solutions for many of the health and resource based
challenges facing the world. [ . . . ] Yet [it] is unlikely to fulfil its potential without appropriate regional,
national and, in some cases, global policies to support its development and application” ([19], p. 8).
It should be noted, however, that the EU strategy does not discard its original focus on
biotechnology, which is well in accordance with the OECD agenda. Instead, it changed the framing of
the bioeconomy’s main purpose toward an overarching post-fossilistic sustainability agenda, within
which biotechnology still has an important—albeit less talked about—role. Indeed, as several studies
stress, the EU’s research programme for a bioeconomy is dominated by a life sciences vision, which
is exemplified by the dominance of the biotechnological research agenda in the Seventh Framework
Programme (FP7) and its successor, Horizon 2020 [12,14,29]. Crucially, both the EU and OECD
strategies regard the bioeconomy primarily as a chance to engender new and sustained economic
growth and enhance competitiveness in a globalised economy. For the EU, the bioeconomy is “a key
element for smart and green growth in Europe” ([2], p. 2), whereas the OECD, in a document from
2006, describes the bioeconomy as “the aggregate set of economic operations in a society that use latent
value incumbent in biological products and processes to capture new growth and welfare benefits for
citizens and nations” ([30], p. 3).
In addition, and partly in reaction, to the dominant biotechnology- and agroindustry-oriented
visions of the bioeconomy, the contours of a third type of vision is emerging. This vision is
oriented toward agro-ecological practices and a more comprehensive understanding of societal
sustainability. Originating from civil society networks, organic farming organisations and critical
academia, this alternative narrative (or set of narratives) articulates organic farming practices and
technologies with socio-political visions of “food sovereignty”, participatory governance and a
sufficiency perspective that rejects economic growth as an end in itself [4,12,31–33]. In an attempt to
influence the European research agenda on the bioeconomy and to get a foothold in the associated
research funds, the European organics industry established a “Technology Platform for Sustainable
Organic and High Welfare Food and Farming Systems (TP Organics)”, which is now one of the
40 European Technology Platforms (ETPs) officially recognized by the European Commission. Its main
function is to identify the research needs of the organic sector and agro-ecological farmers and to relay
research priorities to the policy-makers. In its vision, TP Organics portrayed organic food and farming
systems as “an important and fast-growing part of the European knowledge-based bio-economy” [34]
and devised a research agenda based on agro-ecological principles, eco-functional intensification and
the sufficiency principle [35].
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However, the agro-ecological vision advocated by TP Organics strategically emulates the
European Commission’s dominant narrative of the KBBE in important respects. It emphasises the
need for land use intensification (although the adverb used is ‘eco-functional’ instead of ‘sustainable’),
eco-efficiency and technological innovation and evades the question of economic growth [4]. This might
alienate those parts of the agro-ecological perspective who are opposed to economic growth and the
concept of eco-functional intensification, which might be viewed as being linked to a productivity
oriented practice of organic farming that emulates many principles of conventional farming [36,37].
This alternative perspective within the broader movement of ecological or organic agriculture
puts a stronger emphasis on a socio-political transformation and regards agro-ecology as a key
strategy in the transition to a sustainable post-Capitalist, post-growth society [38–40]. In that sense,
the narrative advocated by TP Organics constitutes only a part—albeit the most influential one—of the
agro-ecological approach to the bioeconomy and may indeed stand in political-economic contradiction
to other strands of the same imaginary that originate from civil society and farmers movements like
Via Campesina and the Food Sovereignty movement [4,32].
In a recent draft European Bioeconomy Stakeholder Manifesto [41], which emerged as a result of
the EC’s plan to review its Bioeconomy Strategy, the vision portrayed by the stakeholders moves a
step closer towards the agro-ecological vision. The stakeholders “regard the transition to a sustainable
and circular bioeconomy as inevitable” (p. 3) and insist that a bioeconomy “should be sustainable
in terms of people (jobs, inclusiveness), planet (biodiversity, ecological balance) and profit (resource
efficiency, competitiveness) and it should contribute to reaching the UN Sustainable Development
Goals” (p. 4). Although these goals and provisions are vague, they nevertheless move the narrative
toward a more emphatic purpose of comprehensive sustainability that includes systemic changes and
not only technological progress.
The three visions of the bioeconomy sketched so far (biotechnology, bio-resources and
agro-ecology) roughly match the typology recently proposed by Bugge et al. [10]. However, they are
organised along socio-technical strategies and thus do not adequately depict the different socio-political
trajectories that a transition to a bioeconomy might entail. For example, the biotechnology vision
and the bio-resource vision are conceptually entangled as both may rely on biotechnology and a
large renewable resource base, while neither vision questions the overall direction of growth-based
capitalist development. The agro-ecology vision, too, may lean more or less towards the application
of advanced technologies and towards a growth-oriented vision of development or a sufficiency
perspective. In analysing stakeholder positions and additional policy documents, we came to the
conclusion that in order to show the possible techno-political bifurcations between different visions
of a bioeconomy, we need to organise our typology along criteria that grasp the more fundamental
questions of societal development entailed in a transition to a bioeconomy.
We therefore propose to locate different visions of the bioeconomy within a field that is constituted
by two dimensions: one is the continuum between visions of agroecology and industrial biotechnology
(the technological dimension), and the other is the continuum between visions of sufficiency and
capitalist expansion (the political-economic dimension). The result is a field within which various
empirical conceptions of the bioeconomy can be located and further hypothetical narratives can
be devised (Figure 1). For practical purposes, we divide the field into four quadrants (A–D),
each representing one of the four resulting paradigmatic combinations. These quadrants mark
paradigmatic zones without clear-cut boundaries; rather, the entire field should be conceived as
a techno-political option space in which various conceivable visions of the bioeconomy can be charted.
The purpose of this option space is not only to systematise empirically existing narratives, but to
show the ‘empty spots’, that is, areas where visions of a bioeconomy could be plausibly (and perhaps
reasonably) constructed but where such narratives do not (yet) exist. We will show for example
that sufficiency-based narratives granting a stronger role for state planning are virtually absent
from the chart. The four quadrants of the techno-political option space are (A) Sustainable Capital;
(B) Eco-Growth; (C) Eco-Retreat; and (D) Planned Transition.
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Figure 1. The techno-political option space for visions of a bioeconomy. 
A) “Sustainable Capital” 
This field is constituted by a belief in both, a technology-led transition to a (global) bioeconomy, 
and the continuation of capitalist growth. Technology plays a key role in all narratives located in this 
field. Some narratives focus on biotechnology as the key to a bioeconomy (like the OECD narrative 
discussed above), others are more neutral as to the types of technology applied, but emphasise the 
role of large scale industrial innovations like “biorefineries” or ascribe a key role to particular types 
of biomass, like cellulose or algae. While narratives in this field typically subscribe to a transition 
imperative, that is, to the historical task of transforming the fossil-fuelled economy into a bio-based 
economy due to climatic and resource challenges, they regard this transition as a source for new and 
sustained economic growth.  
Following Birch et al. [29], we label this field “Sustainable Capital”, as it is premised on the belief 
that in transiting to a renewable resource base, not only will capitalism become sustainable, but 
capital itself will become renewable, and thus sustainable. “In this vision, technological innovation 
unlocks the renewable, biophysical characteristics of nature itself through genetic and bio-molecular 
knowledge, thus enabling the continuing expansion and accumulation of capital“ ([29], p. 2899). 
Crucially, this narrative equates “renewable” with “sustainable” by adding “eco-efficient”: an 
eco-efficient use of renewable resources promises a sustainable economy. Deep changes in the 
political-economic structures of society are not required, according to this strand of theory.  
In line with this logic, narratives in this quadrant do not see a necessity to reduce overall 
consumption or to engage in a politics of sufficiency or voluntary frugality. For example, the global 
challenge of an increasing demand for meat and animal products is framed as an efficiency problem 
that can be met by a “sustainable intensification” of feed and livestock production and thus by 
increased output [4,42,43]. The bioeconomy represents an opportunity to increase global economic 
output further and to overcome the impending resource scarcity of the fossil-fuelled model of 
industrialism. The bioeconomy is generally presented as having no such constraints. The majority of 
official policy documents and state-led bioeconomy strategies is located in this quadrant.  
B) “Eco-Growth” 
Narratives in this field are characterised by a simultaneous belief in agro-ecological and organic 
farming practices on the one hand, and a growth-based capitalist economy on the other. The field is 
dominated by visions of organic entrepreneurship, agro-ecological innovation, small-scale farming 
practices and a regional rather than global focus. Although originally not couched in terms of the 
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A) “Sustainable Capital”
This field is constituted by a belief in both, a technology-led transition to a (global) bioeconomy,
and the continuation of capitalist growth. Technology plays a key role in all narratives located in this
field. Some narratives focus on biotechnology as the key to a bioeconomy (like the OECD narrative
discussed above), others are more neutral as to the types of technology applied, but emphasise the
role of large scale industrial innovations like “biorefineries” or ascribe a key role to particular types
of biomass, like cellulose or algae. While narratives in this field typically subscribe to a transition
imperative, that is, to the historical task of transforming the fossil-fuelled economy into a bio-based
economy due to climatic and resource challenges, they regard this transition as a source for new and
sustained economic growth.
Following Birch et al. [29], we label this field “Sustainable Capital”, as it is premised on the belief
that in transiting to a renewable resource base, not only will capitalism become sustainable, but capital
itself will become renewable, and thus sustainable. “In this vision, technological innovation unlocks the
renewable, biophysical characteristics of nature itself through genetic and bio-molecular knowledge,
thus enabling the continuing expansion and accumulation of capital“ ([29], p. 2899). Crucially,
this narrative equates “renewable” with “sustainable” by adding “eco-efficient”: an eco-efficient use
of renewable resources promises a sustainable economy. Deep changes in the political-economic
structures of society are not required, according to this strand of theory.
In line with this logic, narratives in this quadrant do not see a necessity to reduce overall
consumption or to engage in a politics of sufficiency or voluntary frugality. For example, the global
challenge of an increasing demand for meat and animal products is framed as an efficiency problem that
can be met by a “sustainable intensification” of feed and livestock production and thus by increased
output [4,42,43]. The bioeconomy represents an opportunity to increase global economic output
further and to overcome the impending resource scarcity of the fossil-fuelled model of industrialism.
The bioeconomy is generally presented as having no such constraints. The majority of official policy
documents and state-led bioeconomy strategies is located in this quadrant.
B) “Eco-Growth”
Narratives in this field are characterised by a simultaneous belief in agro-ecological and organic
farming practices on the one hand, and a growth-based capitalist economy on the other. The field is
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dominated by visions of organic entrepreneurship, agro-ecological innovation, small-scale farming
practices and a regional rather than global focus. Although originally not couched in terms of the
bioeconomy (as this term originated in quadrant A), these visions were strategically adapted to the
emerging narratives of a bioeconomy in order not to lose out against the dominant life science and
agro-industries in the race for research funding and political influence [4,12,44]. Although some
narratives in this field refer to “sufficiency” as a guiding principle, the meaning of the term is often
restricted to the input-side of production and does not include the limitation of consumption or
production. For example, TP Organics states that “[o]rganic agriculture [ . . . ] puts into practice the
sufficiency narrative. Compared to conventional agriculture, it is less reliant on external inputs” ([35],
p. 12). The reduction of external inputs for a given output, however, can be better described in terms
of “efficiency” than “sufficiency”. Thus, the organic industry’s allusion to sufficiency in this context
seems to be more of a strategic-rhetoric nature than of a substantial kind, for sufficiency taken seriously
necessarily involves reductions of per capita demand—it means producing and consuming less [45].
Narratives in this quadrant typically do not propose a global transition strategy or a
comprehensive vision of an agro-ecological bioeconomy, but emphasise the important role that organic
farming and agro-ecological practices can play in a post-fossil, bio-based economy [35]. Actors in
this field include national and European organic farming associations and their think-tanks (like TP
Organics) as well as organic enterprises and research institutions.
C) “Eco-Retreat”
We chose the label “Eco-Retreat” to capture all narratives that combine a commitment to ecological
agriculture, forestry and fishery practices on the one hand, and a perspective of socio-economic
sufficiency on the other. These narratives share a common vision for a comprehensive socio-ecological
transition, which changes not only the resource base of the global economy, but the very principles of
production, consumption and distribution, that is, the political-economic structures [46–48]. The clear
priority of these narratives is for human activity to retreat within the biophysical boundaries of the
planet in terms of a strong interpretation of sustainability [49–51]. A central tenet of narratives in
this sector is that such a retreat is impossible with an expanding economic system: retreat therefore
means an overall reduction of material consumption in industrialised countries and an equitable
economic model that provides a “good life” for all [52,53]. Thus, these narratives typically involve
strong claims for global economic and environmental justice [52,54–56] and are oriented toward a
global convergence of resource use and consumption patterns at a sustainable level, which requires a
contraction of resource use patterns in industrial countries [57]. In terms of technology, narratives in
this sector usually do not reject advanced technologies and eco-efficiency, but insist on small economic
scales and democratic control over technologies and economic processes [40,58].
Narratives in this sector are usually not couched in terms of the “bioeconomy”, since this
terminology originated from the “Sustainable Capital” quadrant and is generally being regarded
as hostile to “Eco-retreat” narratives. However, a post-fossil society based on the sufficiency principle
and on an agro-ecological production paradigm will rely on biogenic resources for the production of
food and, to some extent, materials and energy, and therefore be a bioeconomy as well, understood in
a broader sense. Narratives in this sector can be regarded as the marginal counter-narratives to the
dominant elitist visions of the bioeconomy. They are typically emerging from civil society movements
like the degrowth movement [47,59,60], farmer’s movements, the movement for food sovereignty [33],
the environmental movement, green think tanks and critical academia.
D) “Planned Transition”
The fourth quadrant is characterised by the combination of a high (bio-)tech-vision with a
sufficiency narrative. Empirically, there is little evidence of existing narratives in this sector, as the
combination of large-scale high-tech and sufficiency contradicts both the dominant capitalist and the
marginal degrowth-logics. Conceptually, however, this sector offers interesting additional options.
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The point of departure is the subscription to a sufficiency perspective that requires a reduction in
material consumption at least in industrial countries and a global convergence of resource use patterns
on an ecologically sustainable level. In contrast to visions in the “Eco-Retreat” sector, however, visions
in this sector would respond to this challenge by applying advanced technologies on a large-scale
industrial level. Visions may entail biorefineries converting sustainably sourced biomass into all
sorts of products, eco-functional intensification of certain agricultural sectors, global trade in certain
biogenic commodities and (perhaps) the use of biotechnologies and plant genetics. At the same time,
these technologies would not be applied as a source for further growth and capital accumulation (as in
“Sustainable Capital”), but within a politically coordinated strategy of a material contraction of the
economy until human activity is back within the “safe operating space” of the planetary system [49].
The conceptual punchline of this quadrant is, of course, that such visions would have to be
state-centred. As private industrial actors in a capitalist market have an intrinsic interest in capital
accumulation and increasing output, they will not, by themselves, embark on a mission of voluntary
sufficiency. Large-scale industrial structures for production and innovation, however, require respective
organisational structures and financial resources. States would be the only conceivable entities able to
provide the organisational environment and planning capacity necessary for this type of transition.
Private corporations might still be key actors, but states would set the rules of the game and direct
their overall activities. An additional conceptual difficulty in this sector is, of course, that modern
states, too, depend on the income generated from a growing economy [61–63]. Nevertheless, in times
of looming climatic collapse and ecological crisis, scenarios are conceivable, in which states derive
legitimacy from planning, managing and carrying out a transition from a fossil-fuelled to a bio-based
economy that provides a decent standard of living for all.
Table 1 provides a comparative summary of the policy papers selected for this overview (This
overview of national and supranational policy papers is not intended to be comprehensive or
systematic. We limited the selection of papers to OECD countries for practical purposes and for
comparability, as the focus of this paper is the European rather than the global bioeconomy discourse.
Future research could extend the scope of analysis and make use of emerging databases of policy
papers worldwide (including bioresource-rich countries like Brazil, Malaysia and others) like the
BioSTEP project of the EU (http://www.bio-step.eu/).), while Figure 2 shows their position within
the techno-political option space. In the top right corner of Figure 2, we can see a cluster consisting
of the OECD, the USA and—with a small gap—Germany. The USA and OECD clearly focus their
bioeconomy visions on the advancement of biotechnology as a new source of economic growth.
The German position is similar but has a stronger emphasis on the bioeconomy’s role in meeting global
challenges like climate change, resource scarcity and food security. If taken seriously, this emphasis
might weaken somewhat the vision’s insistence on economic growth. The European Commission’s
official vision (2012) is couched in terms of “smart and green growth”, thus combining the growth
narrative with a commitment to tackling the grand societal challenges. The focus on biotechnology is
no longer explicit. Interestingly, the narrative generated in a draft stakeholder manifesto (EU 2016)
pushes the vision further towards comprehensive sustainability goals.
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Table 1. Overview of national and regional bioeconomy strategies.
Country/
Organisation Document Title Vision/Motivation Main Objectives Main Strategies and Measures
OECD (2009) The Bioeconomy to 2030:Designing a Policy Agenda [19]
To encourage the application of
biotechnology as a driver of
economic growth
To help establish a global
bioeconomy, based on the
application of biotechnology
Boost research; create international agreements to create
markets for sustainable biotech-products; create
international standards and regulatory systems for the use
of biotechnology in agriculture, health and industry
USA (2012) National BioeconomyBlueprint [64]
To advance economic activity
that is fuelled by research and
innovation in the biological
sciences; reduce dependence
on oil
Expansion of emerging
bio-technologies
Support R&D activities; facilitate transition of
bioinventions from lab to market; reduce regulatory
barriers; update training programs; Identify and support
opportunities for the development of public-private
partnerships
EU (2012)
Innovating for Sustainable
Growth: A Bioeconomy for
Europe [2]
To boost “smart and green
growth” in Europe; to tackle
societal challenges like food
security, natural resources
sustainability, climate change
mitigation
Maintain and create economic
growth
and jobs, reduce fossil fuel
dependence; improve
sustainability of industries
Investments in research, innovation and skills; reinforced
policy interaction and stakeholder engagement;
enhancement of markets and competitiveness in
bioeconomy.
Focus is on bio-based products and food-production
systems, not on biotechnology per se.
EU (2016) European BioeconomyStakeholders Manifesto [41]
To facilitate an accelerated
transition from a fossil fuel
economy to a bioeconomy; to
make Europe a leader in a
sustainable bioeconomy
To create a bioeconomy that is
sustainable in terms of ‘people,
planet and profit’ and that
contributes to reaching the UN
SDGs and the 2 ◦C climate goal
Enhance connectivity throughout value chain; more
efficient use of biomass; close cycles of biomass and
construct circular economy; PPPs for biorefineries, etc.;
creating demand through public procurement
Germany (2011) National Research StrategyBioeconomy 2030 [65]
Vision of a sustainable biobased
economy by 2030; necessary to
meet global challenges like food
security and climate protection
The optimal utilisation of the
chances created by
(bio)technological progress; to
achieve technology leadership
Focus on research activity and innovation policy in the
field of biotechnology as a “major source of impetus”
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Table 1. Cont.
Country/
Organisation Document Title Vision/Motivation Main Objectives Main Strategies and Measures
Sweden (2012)
Swedish Research and
Innovation Strategy for a
Bio-based Economy [66]
Transition from a fossil fuel
economy to a more
resource-efficient economy
based on renewable raw
materials that are produced
through the sustainable use of
ecosystem services from land
and water
To reduce climate effects and
the use of fossil-based raw
materials; to optimise the value
and contribution of ecosystem
services to the economy
Replacement of fossil-based with bio-based raw materials;
smarter products and smarter use of raw materials;
change in consumption habits and attitudes; reducing
consumption of goods without affecting consumer living
standards (e.g., through products with higher
quality/durability, etc.)
Austria (2015)
Status Quo Bioökonomie und
FTI-Aktivitäten in
Österreich—auf dem Weg zur
Bioökonomie-FTI-Strategie
(“Status Quo Bioeconomy and
R&D-Activities in Austria:
towards a
Bioeconomy-R&D-Strategy”.
Translation by the authors.) [67]
To strengthen the economy’s
resilience and value added; to
support the gradual transition
from a fossil economy to a
sustainable economy;
To strengthen the Circular
Economy; increase resource
efficiency and cascading use of
bioresources; technology
leadership in core industries
(e.g., wood-based products)
Focus is on the material and integrated utilisation of
biogenic resources (mainly forestry and agro-based) for
non-food purposes; insist on “comprehensive
sustainability”; insist on public participation and
stakeholder involvement
TP Organics (2014)
Strategic Research and
Innovation
Agenda for Organic Food and
Farming [35]
To contribute to “sustainable
food security” by strengthening
the “sufficiency narrative”:
reducing external inputs in
production.
To secure a strong role for
organic farming systems in the
European bioeconomy
Eco-functional intensification; empowerment of rural
areas; food for health and well-being
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The absence of economic growth as a core objective is even more pronounced in policy papers
from Austria and Sweden. In the Austrian case, which will be analysed in more detail in the next
section, the focus is on the “resilience” of the economy and on the creation of a closed value-added cycle
(instead of a chain) based on the resource-efficient and cascading use of biomass. The role of technology
is writ large, but it must be applied with the objective to reach the comprehensive sustainability of
society. While the Austrian strategy paper does not mention the need for a sufficiency perspective or
for reduced consumption levels, the Swedish strategy paper is unique in going a step further in this
direction. Here, the vision is a transition from a fossil fuel economy to an economy that is based on the
sustainable use of ecosystem services. A constitutive part of the Swedish vision is the need to reduce
the consumption of goods without affecting consumer living standards. This provision makes the
Swedish strategy the only one to contain a sufficiency perspective. However, concrete proposals for
measures to achieve the goal of reduced consumption levels are quite limited: to make products of
higher quality, such as in the case of clothes, or to produce goods with a longer shelf-life. Nevertheless,
the Swedish strategy is still shy of tackling the “hot potato” issues of sufficiency, like reducing meat
and dairy consumption or limiting private motorised transport.
The strategy paper by TP Organics, finally, is the only one located in the quadrant “Eco-Growth”,
however touching the boundary to “Eco-Retreat”. This is due to the fact, that, while the think tank
adheres to an agro-ecological perspective on technology (which includes high-tech innovation for
eco-functional intensification), it has an ambiguous stance on the question of growth. On the one hand,
it posits the organics industry as supporting the “sufficiency narrative”, but on the other, it equates the
meaning of sufficiency with “reduced external inputs”, which is tantamount to efficiency, not sufficiency.
3. Stakeholder Positions: The Case of AUSTRIA
Policy papers typically represent condensed strategic discourses and action programmes that are
based on compromises between institutions (ministries and agencies) and different elites (business,
politics, some academia), and which do not necessarily reflect the positions, worldviews and opinions
of a wide range of other stakeholders. We therefore additionally interviewed a total of 29 stakeholders
in Austria from various relevant fields within the bioeconomy discourse, broadly conceived. The aim
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was to complete the picture and to carve out the different political, academic and ideological positions
that make up the current techno-political option space for a transition to a bioeconomy in Austria.
It should be noted that some of the stakeholders interviewed are professionals in business
associations and the public administration who might have had some influence in devising the
Austrian bioeconomy strategy. Their views as stakeholders representing their respective professional
association might differ significantly from the Austrian policy paper, however, since policy papers
are typically based on institutional compromises and worded in a diplomatic tone. Our intention in
including stakeholder positions in this survey was thus to represent a broad range of professional
opinions from divergent societal sectors that can be contrasted and compared with official policy
papers. To be sure, most stakeholders interviewed could be regarded as forming part of an elite (at least
in terms of education), but the point of broadening the scope beyond business and policy elites is to
include marginalised positions from civil society and critical academia as well.
Figure 3 shows the position of selected Austrian stakeholders on the bioeconomy within the
techno-political option space. The stakeholders come from the realms of research, (environmental
and agricultural) non-governmental organisations (NGOs), consulting, lobbying, several industrial
branches related to the bioeconomy (pulp and paper, bioenergy, forestry) and public administration and
were interviewed on a wide range of aspects of a bioeconomy. Their position within the techno-political
option space was determined based on answers regarding assessments of the bioeconomy’s relation
to “smart and green growth”, technological options to tackle the efficiency-challenge, the biogenic
resource potential and risks regarding the widening of access to biogenic resources.
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Figure 3. Position of Austrian stakeholders within the techno-political option space. 
A first visual analysis reveals that most stakeholder positions are dispersed according to a “Milky
Way”-like band stretching from the centre of “Sustainable Capital” (A) via the bottom right corner of
“Planned Transition” (D) to the top of “Eco-Retreat” (C). The majority of positions (17 stakeholders or
59%) is located in sector A, which appears to contain the mainstream vision. Perhaps not surprisingly,
all stakeholders from business associations (processing industry, bioenergy and agricultural) as well as
all public administration officials are located in this quadrant. However, only a minority of scientists
(37.5%) and only one NGO share this view.
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Sector D (5 stakeholders or 17%) is populated by 4 (out of 8) scientists and an energy consultant.
This shows that half the scientists interviewed tend to favour a planned transition toward a
sufficiency-based bioeconomy that utilises (but is not solely predicated on) high technology. Sector
C (6 stakeholders or 21%), by contrast, is populated exclusively by NGOs (four environmental and
one agricultural), the majority of which is bordering to quadrant D. The agricultural NGO is the most
radically sufficiency-oriented and technology-averse stakeholder. Sector B, finally, attracts only one
stakeholder, who is a scientist. This might be counted as an indication that the combination of an
agro-ecological vision with one of capitalist growth is somewhat counter-intuitive and may make sense
mainly as a strategic narrative of market-oriented organic businesses as represented by TP Organics.
In a second step we can identify three distinct clusters within the “Milky Way” band. The largest
one is located in the middle of sector A and comprises a third (11 out of 29) of the stakeholders. It is
in good coherence with the European Commission’s official strategy “Innovating for Sustainable
Growth: A Bioeconomy for Europe” [2] and is dominated by business associations. We might call it
the “industry cluster”. Moving toward the centre of the graph, there is a smaller cluster that exhibits
a more critical stance to the growth paradigm and to (bio-)technological progress. This cluster is
dominated by public administration bodies and scientists. It is conspicuous that a majority of public
administration stakeholders interviewed (3 out of 5) are located here. We may therefore call it the
“public administration cluster”. A third cluster (9 stakeholders) can be identified at the border area of
sectors C and D and consists of scientists, NGOs and an energy consultant. This cluster, which may be
termed the “civil society” cluster, is decidedly sceptical of economic growth as a societal vision and
more or less neutral towards the utilisation of advanced technology. This can be interpreted in that
technology is regarded as a means to the end of a bio-based sustainability transition rather than as
an end in itself.
This clustering is revealing in that it shows that the representatives of the state seem to be
positioned somewhere between the visions of industry (high growth, high tech) and civil society
(state-sponsored and sufficiency-based transition to sustainability), with science supporting the visions
of the state and civil society and some public officials supporting the industry vision.
Moving through the quadrants of the techno-political option space, we can now identify
paradigmatic examples of the respective narratives they encapsulate. A typical position representing
the narrative of “Sustainable Capital” is that of a representative of an industrial association. He believes
that economic growth will continue to be essential and that growth related problems should be
addressed through population politics. The bioeconomy is key to a future sustainable society, which
will be based on hydrogen as a main source of industrial energy. The climate goals must not be
reached by a strategy of economic degrowth or deindustrialisation, but through efficiency gains and an
industrial transition. A representative of a business association sums up his position as thus: “At the
end of the day it is about growth, about jobs, about European and Austrian added value. That is what
is important to us”.
One researcher in quadrant D (a professor of engineering, whose position is located at the upper
right fringe of the civil society cluster) provides a good example of the narrative of a “Planned
Transition”: He believes that the transition to a bioeconomy is inevitable, but that the question is
how it is organised. He does not believe in the bioeconomy to be an engine for “smart and green
growth” (“the EU-speak is always a growth-speak”), but assumes that the industrialised world is
entering an era of post-growth. He puts much hope in the concept of biorefineries, for which he sees
great potential in Austria, especially as an extension of the pulp industry. This includes, for example,
the production of hydrogen from biomass. The main challenge, according to him, is how to align the
conservationist requirements of a bioeconomy (to secure biodiversity, soil fertility, water resources,
the long-term availability of biogenic resources, etc.) with the economic requirements. He claims that
the market is ill equipped to achieve this task. Instead, new mechanisms and “institutions for regional
and participatory resource planning” are required. Furthermore, a radical ecological tax reform is
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necessary that puts the tax burden on resources and not on labour. These grave changes might result
in a new economic system, and in a new institutional landscape.
The narrative of “Eco-Growth”, in turn, is epitomised by its only proponent in this survey,
a scientist working for an eco-business-oriented research institute. His central tenet is the belief
in the concept of a “sustainable intensification of land use”, while acknowledging the associated
risks of biodiversity loss and soil degradation. According to him, sustainable intensification is
a necessity for a bioeconomy. He is convinced that under certain, ambitious conditions (cascadic
use of biomass, integrated biorefineries, sustainable intensification of land use, eco-efficiency, circular
economy) the bioeconomy can be an economic growth engine. Overall, his narrative is both techno-
and eco-optimistic and based on the belief in the reconcilability of further economic expansion and
an agro-ecological socio-technical paradigm.
The narrative of “Eco-Retreat” is perhaps best captured by the representative of the agricultural
NGO. For her, the mainstream conception of the bioeconomy is “the latest strategy of industry,
science and state institutions to gain power over the planet’s biological resources”. This includes the
strategy of the sustainable intensification of land use, which is an attempt “to sugar-coat neoliberal,
industry-driven strategies”. She proposes to use the term agro-ecology instead of bioeconomy to
denote a sustainable and equitable agro-economy that is based on biogenic resources. The strategy
of further economic growth—“green” or otherwise—is declared to be in direct contradiction to the
principles of agro-ecology. Although her approach involves technological innovation as an important
element (especially in the sense of appropriate agricultural technologies to be applied in the global
south), technology is not regarded as the key to an agro-ecological transition.
Our analysis of stakeholder positions shows that creating a typology of visions of the
bioeconomy according to mainly technical criteria (i.e., biotechnology, bio-resources, agro-ecology) as in
Bugge et al. [10] runs the risk of neglecting important—and, in our view, decisive—political dimensions
that reveal the highly conflictive developmental trajectories associated with each vision. For example,
Bugge et al.’s ‘bio-ecological’ vision does not show the techno-political cleavage between the visions
of “Eco-Growth” and “Eco-Retreat”, which both rely on the agro-ecological paradigm as a common
socio-technical platform. Similarly, the techno-political differences between the visions “Sustainable
Capital” and “Planned Transition” are massive, although both may rely on a socio-technical vision that
entails the use of bio-technology and the reliance on bio-resources. Thus, by adding the dimension of
“growth vs. sufficiency” to the socio-technical dimension, we arrive at a much more comprehensive
option-space that reveals the techno-political cleavages between different visions of the bioeconomy.
4. Modelling a Low-Carbon Bioeconomy for Austria—What Are the Options?
Policy papers and stakeholder positions often do not explicitly consider given biophysical
limitations due to area and productivity constraints. To further enrich the discussion of techno-political
options for a transition to a sustainable bioeconomy, we therefore add the perspective of biophysical
modelling, using the future bioeconomy of Austria as a case study. We present scenario results from a
complex system model [68] that was generated for the research project ”BioTransform.at” (Funded by
the Austrian Climate Research Programme (ACRP), Project number B368631, 2014–2016.), of which
this article also forms part. By locating the modelled scenarios within the techno-political option space,
we can elucidate possible gaps between techno-political visions and biophysical options for Austria as
a case study. The combination of discourse-analytical and biophysical modelling methods allows us
to integrate the discursively constructed narratives in the techno-political option-space with a set of
scenarios in the biophysical option-space of society.
The subject of investigation includes all relevant types of primary biomass, conversion processes
(wood processing industries and advanced biomaterial production, food supply, animal husbandry,
energy generation) and a complete representation of the energy sector. The geographical scope is
Austria and the considered timeframe 2010–2050. The optimization target is to minimize greenhouse
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gas (GHG) emissions under given dynamic constraints (imposing limits on fuel switch rates, technology
diffusion, crop rotation and many more), while economic aspects are disregarded.
The scenarios differ in terms of six influencing parameters relevant for the future supply potential
and demand for domestic biomass. The developments of these parameters include trend extrapolations
and business as usual assumptions on the one hand, and more speculative assumptions considered
feasible in case of targeted policy intervention on the other. These exogenous parameters are
developments in dietary habits, land use change, forest management, average crop yields, food
losses and assumptions regarding bioenergy production from crop by-products (which represent
a considerable unused potential for energy production).
In Scenario A (‘Reference’) the main historical trends concerning these parameters remain
unchanged until 2050; i.e., no serious initiatives or policy intervention take place to reduce food
losses, change dietary habits and to utilize crop by-products for energy; average crop yields continue
to increase, albeit only moderately. In scenario B (‘Intensive’) higher agricultural yield increases and
additional wood removals from small private forests are assumed, and crop by-products are assumed
to be available as bioenergy source. Scenario C (‘Alternative’) is characterized by the aim to avoid
intensification in biomass production. This is implemented as a more pronounced shift to healthy and
no- or low-meat diets compared to Scenario A and B, reduced land use change after 2020, reduced
food losses, constant average crop yields and forest management with longer rotation periods.
The scenarios demonstrate that a transformation to a low-carbon bioeconomy until 2050 is
technically feasible without increasing net biomass imports to Austria—but only if energy consumption
is reduced significantly, other renewable energy sources are employed intensively and biomass and
bioenergy are utilized in an efficient way. The scenarios also illustrate that—with regard to biomass
supply and consumption—quite different pathways are possible. Technically, this has been achieved
by exogenously assuming different future developments in dietary habits, land use change, forest
management, average crop yields, food losses and bioenergy from crop residues. GHG reductions
of at least 80% compared to Austria’s Kyoto baseline are achieved in an “intensive” as well as an
“alternative” scenario with regard to these parameters: In Scenario B (“Intensive”) large additional
amounts of biomass are mobilized. Total domestic biomass consumption increases by more than 30%
from 2010 to 2050, mainly due to higher agricultural yields and an enhanced use of crop residues
for energy and material uses. In Scenario C (“Alternative”) total biomass consumption increases by
only 12%, but due to a greater shift towards no- and low-meat diets, lower food losses and reduced
loss of agricultural land, primary biomass can be diverted to bioenergy and biomaterials production.
GHG emissions related to food supply (or rather animal husbandry) are also clearly lower in C than
in B.
Where do these scenarios figure, then, in terms of the techno-political option space discussed
in this paper (Figure 4)? First, all three scenarios assume a reduction of overall energy consumption
of about 40%, based on the “WAM plus scenario” (With Additional Measures plus) developed in
the context of Austria’s GHG reporting obligation [69]. These reductions are assumed to be possible
only with sufficiency measures in private transport and consumer goods. A change in consumption
patterns towards a “sharing economy”, which implies a marked reduction in private ownership of
long-lived consumer goods, as well as a penalisation of planned obsolescence are mentioned in the
storyline underpinning the WAM plus scenario. Another crucial aspect is a significant shift in the
modal split of transportation. All this amounts to a quite substantial politics of sufficiency for all
scenarios, which will require rather courageous political planning, steering and intervention.
Where are the differences, then? In contrast to reference scenario A, both scenarios B and C reach
the stipulated GHG reduction objective of 80%, which is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition
for being considered “sustainable”. This objective, however, is achieved by contrasting measures,
corresponding to different techno-political narratives underlying the scenarios: Scenario B is based
on the vision of a further intensification of land use, i.e., continued linear increases of agricultural
yields through (bio-)technological progress, increased industrial inputs (i.e., synthetic fertilizers and
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pesticides) and an increase of wood harvests. Scenario C, by contrast, is based on a vision of less
intensive farming practices, with agricultural yields remaining on current levels and a less intensive
use of forests. The lower productivity of land in scenario C is compensated by a pronounced shift to a
vegetarian or low-meat diet, which is a stark commitment to a socio-political sufficiency perspective.
In sum, the model results show, first, that all viable options for a low-carbon bioeconomy in
Austria are necessarily tied to a rather substantial politics of sufficiency, without which the limited
biogenic resources will not suffice to keep a bioeconomy going. Second, scenarios B and C illustrate
that only an even stronger focus on sufficiency, here in particular with regard to food consumption,
allows for a more extensive/agro-ecological land use with lower land productivities. The structural
(socio-economic and political) implications for society are not yet fully understood, but may be
far-reaching. Figure 4 shows the resulting location of the model scenarios in the techno-political
option space:
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one of the scenarios is located in the politically favoured quadrant “Sustainable Capital”
(although A and B are touching the border), but t o of the are located in the quadrant “Planned
Transition”, of hich only one reaches the GHG emission targets. The third scenario is located in
the quadrant “Eco-Retreat”. This is remarkable as it shows a rather significant gap between the
politically salient and elite-driven visions of “Sustainable Capital” and the available biophysical
options. It also hints at a gap between different state-sponsored political strategies that rely on
different and potentially mutually exclusive buzzwords like “green growth” and “sharing economy”.
Identifying and understanding the different socio-economic and political trajectories that are implied
in such diverging visions, as well as their concrete policy implications, remains an important task not
only for social scientists.
5. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
“Energy transformations”, Barry et al. state, “are political struggles, not simply technological,
market-driven policy decisions” ([70], p. 3). Indeed, they continue, “political contestation, struggle and
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antagonism are central to understanding and analysing, as well as effecting low carbon socio-energy
transformations” ([70], p. 3).
These words should caution us not to take the transformation to a bioeconomy too lightly and
not to regard it as a pre-defined techno-scientific project that simply changes the way we produce
our goods and heat our homes. A transition to a bioeconomy is more than an energy transformation:
it is a wholesale resource transformation that will change—in the last instance—the very nature of
societies and the face of the planet. A transition is inevitable, but the question is to which bioeconomy
that supports which type of society. What will be the political-economic structure of the bioeconomy?
What will be the role of the state? Which technologies will be used and on whose behalf? Who will
have access to which bio-resources? Who will be exceluded? Whatever the answers to these questions,
there will be winners and losers in the process, and there will be social antagonisms within and
between nations about the objectives, principles, moral standards, economic structures and material
boundaries of the new economic model.
Our analysis of diverging visions of a bioeconomy showed that there is a considerable gap
between policy papers and visions supported by various stakeholders, including scientists and civil
servants. What is more, there is a gap, at least in the case of Austria analysed in this paper, between the
official strategies and the biophysical option space identified in a complex system model. The resulting
map of positions is presented in Figure 5:
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This diagram was created combining three different methods of extracting and interpreting
techno-political narratives: the hermeneutic interpretation of policy documents; the coding and
interpretation of stakeholder interviews and the interpretation of scenarios in a biophysical model.
We thus combined hermeneutic methods used in science- and technology studies (STS) with biophysical
methods used in sustainability sciences. The result is an illuminative heuristic, which allows us to
compare and contrast different visions of the bioeconomy and to highlight conspicuous gaps and
inconsistencies as well as clusters and continuities. The results should be taken with some diligent
caution, however. The mix of methods applied here requires a level of interpretation that cannot
Sustainability 2017, 9, 669 18 of 22
easily be measured against quantifiable criteria. Different scholars might have arrived at slightly
different interpretations of the respective positions, resulting in a slightly different mapping of the
techno-political option space. Despite the necessary interpretive latitude, we believe that the results
presented here are robust and provide an interesting point of departure for further debates on divergent
visions of the bioeconomy.
Perhaps the most striking result of our analysis is that all official policy papers are located in the
“Sustainable Capital” quadrant that combines a vision of biotechnological progress with a narrative
of green growth. Austrian stakeholders, even the representatives of business associations, are more
moderate in their views on economic growth and biotechnology than some of the policy papers
defining the mainstream vision of the bioeconomy. What is more, several stakeholder positions, mostly
academic, as well as two out of three biophysical scenarios, are located in the “Planned Transition”
quadrant, which combines a vision of technological progress with a narrative of sufficiency that requires
much more coordinated and programmatic action by the state. Although the strategy papers of Austria
and Sweden are relatively close to that quadrant, they still do not embrace the necessity of stringent
sufficiency measures that is suggested by biophysical model results. The vision of “Eco-Growth” is
hardly popular in Austria and is, more importantly, not considered a viable scenario in the biophysical
modelling exercise [68]. Nevertheless, it has been identified as one of three visions of the bioeconomy
in academic literature by Bugge et al. [10]. This mismatch between academic (and policy) discourse on
the one hand and biophysical options and stakeholder visions on the other requires further scrutiny.
Lastly, the vision of “Eco-retreat”, which is popular with NGOs, does not figure in the academic
discourse on the bioeconomy, although it is more plausible in biophysical terms than the vision of
“Sustainable Capital”.
It seems that official visions of the emerging bioeconomy are following a particular purpose
or agenda that has not yet entered into serious conversation with deviant positions in the scientific
community and civil society. The concept of the bioeconomy has been termed an “elite master
narrative” by Birch et al. [29] and our own analysis tends to support this view. Efforts by the European
Commission to enter into a meaningful process of stakeholder consultations have started to change
this picture to some extent, as the marked shift between the EC’s own strategy paper of 2012 [2] and
the draft EU stakeholder manifesto of 2016 [41] demonstrates. This process shows that a meaningful
conversation with other than industrial perspectives leads to substantial shifts between the imaginaries
on which narratives of the envisaged bioeconomy are based.
A detailed discussion of what these shifts might entail for the roles of the state, business, academia
and civil society is beyond the scope of this paper. However, a few tentative conclusions can be drawn:
• If narratives within the quadrant of “Sustainable Capital” are biophysically implausible,
then relevant bodies of the state should start thinking about shifting their own conception
of the bioeconomy towards a more sufficiency- and planning-oriented narrative. This would
create tensions within the state and between state and business actors, which would need to be
addressed both scientifically and politically. It is indeed alarming that all policy papers examined
in this paper are located in the “Sustainable Capital” quadrant.
• The role of the state in a transition to a bioeconomy might need to be stronger than most policy
papers and industry-oriented stakeholder positions suggest. This is because a transition to a
(sustainable) bioeconomy may to a much larger than presently conceded extent have to be planned
rather than left to the market. The role of academia—who seems to reflect this problematic in
their stakeholder positions—should be to explore this question further and to expose the cleavage
between the biophysical option-space and the dominant policy narratives.
• Civil society actors might capitalise on the apparent discrepancy between official visions of the
bioeconomy on the one hand and biophysical reality and some academic positions on the other.
They might feel motivated by this discrepancy to devise their own alternative visions and to push
both policy-makers and business actors to re-evaluate their respective visions.
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If this conversation is to be continued and the generation of visions and imaginaries of the
bioeconomy not to be left to narrowly-defined elites, then processes of serious stakeholder engagement
and citizen participation need to be set up [71]. If the transition to a bioeconomy is to be democratic,
it will have to start with openly debating not only the means but also the aims, contours, limits,
moral standards and principles of that future economic model.
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